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DIRECT ACTIONS AGAINST INSURERS  
IN CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS IN 
AN EUROPEANISED PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW – WHAT PROTECTION FOR THE INJURED 
PARTIES?
Summary:   This article offers a discussion of the law applicable to cross-border traffic 
accidents, from the perspective of the protection of injured parties. The 
introduction of principles like direct actions against insurers by injured third 
parties (forum actoris), mostly because of CJeU’s liberal approach, puts into 
question the relationship between european private international law and 
national Member State rules of conflict-of-laws. This article aims to propose an 
answer to the question “Does the european private international law set of rules 
offer an adequate protection for the injured parties?” with the view of offering 
also a few recommendations for the reformation of the Rome ii Regulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The constant evolution of different areas of law under the blessings of globalization and 
Europeanisation is a process that brings about changes within national Member State (MS) 
concepts that are worth of an examination. Private international law (to be found throughout 
this article also as PIL) makes no exception in this regard.1 Evolutions in European jurispru-
dence on private international law and their repercussion in the European PIL have inspired 
this article and a line of thought that has been developed these past years in legal research2 
on the Europeanisation of PIL: starting with the obligation of recognition and application 
of previously acquired rights for individuals and companies, with the aim of ensuring a ful-
ly functional and operational internal market within the territorial space of the European 
Union (EU),3 to assuring the protection of “weaker parties” in cases of claims for compensa-
tion in non-contractual liability (tort) law, the concept of defending the “vulnerable” merits 
a thorough examination in so far as to understand the extent of which these multiple and 
sometimes freshly constructed mechanisms,4 have influenced the sphere of European private 
international law. 
In the view of globalization, people are interacting more than ever with one-another in 
contexts of cross-border settings, whereas developments in transport and technology are by 
all means facilitating this globalist approach of the modern life. Thus, for instance a French 
citizen that rents online an Austrian-based car, in order to spend his vacations travelling in 
Slovenia and probably causing an accident that involves a local resident, is a scenario that 
might very likely happen. Within the space of the European Union, these new developments 
have been crucial for the reshaping of private international law, often leading to what aca-
demics call a “new legal discipline”, commonly referred as European private international law.5 
Even though often it is indeed labelled as new, European private international law is quite a 
consolidated discipline and this article will lead into a deeper exploration of this context.
In order to continue the line of thought expressed earlier, this article aims to cast some 
light in a very specific concept of the way how European private international law deals with 
the claims for compensation in non-contractual liability cases and how it influences individual 
MS’s private international law. Hence, the direct action against insurers mainly for traffic acci-
1  Mills, A., Rediscovering the public dimension of private international law, 30 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR), (2012), 
pp. 371–375.
2  See Kuipers, J. J., Cartesio and Grunkin-Paul. Mutual Recognition as a Vested Rights Theory based on Party Autonomy in Private law, 
2 European Journal of Legal Studies (2008), p. 66–96. See also Vyshka, K., Changing balances of Pil theories in a europeanized 
Private international law, Maastricht Journal of european and Comparative law (2018), Vol. 25(5) 533–550.
3  See jurisprudence like Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello, EU:C:2003:539, Case C-353/06 Grunkin-Paul, EU:C:2008:559 and in 
company law, more recently Case C-106/16 Polbud, EU:C:2017:804. For more on this topic, see Vyshka, K., Changing balances 
of Pil theories in a europeanized Private international law, Maastricht Journal of european and Comparative law (2018), Vol. 25(5) 
533–550.
4  Almost exclusively by the activism of the Court of Justice, which sometimes is heavily criticized by the academia; see for instance 
Davies, G Does the Court of Justice own the Treaties? interpretative pluralism as a solution to over-constitutionalization, eur law J. 
(2018); p. 358–375.
5  See Joerges, C., The Challenges of europeanization in the Realm of Private law: A Plea for a new legal Discipline, Duke Journal of 
Comparative and international law, Vol 14:149, (2004) p. 149–196.
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dents within the territory of the EU will be discussed. With the Odenbreit6 jurisprudence, the 
CJEU interpreted in a novel way the possibility of undertaking a direct action against insurers, 
because of its interest to protect weaker parties.7 The forum actoris that the Odenbreit8 case 
established is also expected to bring a considerable amount of changes in litigation practices 
in non-contractual liability.9
The realm of cross-border traffic accidents is by no means an easy one to understand, nor 
an area in which the Europeanisation of conflict-of-law rules has been fully completed.10 Being 
a decisive area of practical importance, it does seem as the Rome II Regulation plays a great 
role as an influential instrument for the rules designating the applicable law.11 Thus, recital 6 
of the Regulation notes that “the proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in 
order to improve the predictability of the outcome litigation, certainty as to the law applicable 
and the free movement of judgements, for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to 
designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the court in which an action is 
brought.”12 
For a part of the academia, it would seem like Rome II Regulation “flatters itself”13 when 
it says that it contributes to improve the legal certainty of European citizens and that it even 
“exaggerates” in this self-assessment, since it nevertheless, gives way of application also to 
the Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents,14 already putting an extra 
layer of complexion to the cross-border traffic accidents, which now are between a binome of 
instruments. 
The most important twist that concerns this study, is that depending on which court is 
seized to give a ruling upon a cross-border traffic accident, the applicable law will be governed 
either by Rome II Regulation, or the Hague Convention.15 The scenario of “forum-shopping” 
does then look as very likely, since the victim has the ability to choose between different con-
flict regimes, leading to the application of different substantive laws.16 
Therefore, the relationship between Rome II Regulation and The Hague Convention on the 
law applicable to traffic accidents needs to be examined and explained throughout. However, it 
is erroneous to believe that cross-border traffic accidents are ruled only within this binome. It 
6  Case C463/06 Odenbreit, ECLI:EU:C:2007:792.
7  See Knetsch, J., “La réparation du dommage extracontractuel en droit international privé” in le droit à l’épreuve des sciècles et des 
frontières, Lextenso (2018), p. 979–1018, at p. 980.
8  Case C463/06 Odenbreit, ECLI:EU:C:2007:792.
9  Knetsch, op. cit., p. 979–1018.
10  Graziano, T. The Rome ii Regulation and The Hague Conventions on Traffic Accidents and Product liability – interaction, conflicts and 
future perspectives, nederlands internationaal Privaatrecht (niPR) (2008), 425–429, at p. 425.
11  idem, see also in general Van Calster, G european Private international law, (2010) Hart Publishing.
12  Recital 6, Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
13  Nagy, C., The Rome ii Regulation and Traffic Accidents: Uniform Conflict Rules with some Room for Forum Shopping – How so?, Journal 
of Private International Law, Vol 6, Issue 1, 2010, 93–108, at p. 93.
14  Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents; Concluded at The Hague on 4 May 1971.
15  See in general Graziano, op. cit., pp. 425–429.
16  Nagy, op. cit., p. 94.
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seems more of a tripartite relationship when we realize that instruments like the Motor Insur-
ance Directives17 also apply. It becomes even more interesting on the point of view of the vic-
tim, since the MIDs are de facto a “social policy seeking to minimize the impact, on victims, of 
the large volumes of loss and injury that occur in the EU as a result of road traffic accidents.”18 
Therefore, in a nutshell this article aims to explore how the European private international 
law rules of non-contractual obligations protect the victims and injured parties in cases of 
cross-border traffic accidents and by identifying the disadvantages in the system, to ascertain 
if a “modernization” of Rome II Regulation is needed. In principle, this article will indeed find 
that certain aspects of Rome II are unsatisfactory as regards providing a full protection for the 
injured parties (its co-existence with The Hague Convention and the exclusion of issue-by-is-
sue analysis, or else known as dépeçage above all), but will also confirm that the CJEU juris-
prudence in matters of direct actions against insurers are a good step forward. 
All in all, our premise is that EU law influences the methods of private international law 
and this article reinforces the general picture of the influence of European private internation-
al law upon traditional private international laws in individual Member States (MS), through 
the application of the forum actoris, or the possibility of the injured party to bring a direct 
action against the insurer before the courts of his/her country of residence. 
This article first assesses the position of injured parties from the law applicable to cross-bor-
der traffic accidents, namely the general rules of Rome II Regulation in section 2. An analysis 
following Article 4 of Rome II is carried out in this section, highlighting especially the conse-
quences for injured parties of the exclusion of the so-called dépeçage principle. Section 3 then 
explores the inconveniences in this regard that this policy choice of excluding the application 
of dépeçage has for the protection of injured parties, analyzing as well the case law of CJEU 
on determining a right of direct action against insurers for injured parties. A fourth section 
concludes and invites for a re-shaping of the policies within Rome II, especially centered to 
cross-border traffic accidents. 
2.  THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 
– A REFLECTION ACCORDING TO THE VICTIM’S POINT OF VIEW
Since 11 January 2009,19 the Rome II Regulation has established a unification of the the 
non-contractual obligations area of European PIL. As such, the Rome II Regulation20 puts in 
place a number of unified rules which have direct effect as regards conflict-of-laws for a spe-
cific part of the private international law. The practical significance of these rules in national 
17  Council Directives 72/166/EEC [1972] OJ L103\ 84/5/EEC [1984] OJ L8/17) 90/232/EEC [1990] OJ L129/33; 2000/26/EC 
[2000] OJ L181/65 and 2005/14/EC [2005] OJ L149/14, consolidated in Directive 2009/103/EC [2009] OJ L263/11. 
18  Papettas, J., Direct Actions against insurers of intra-Community Cross-Border Traffic Accidents: Rome ii and the Motor insurance 
Directives, Journal of Private international law, Vol 8, Issue 2, 2012, (2012) p. 297–321, at p. 297.
19  Articles 31–32 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
20  See in general Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
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Member State PIL is deemed to be high,21 especially in relation to European tort law. In cases 
of random and unplanned damages that include a foreign (European) element, it is logical that 
legal certainty is one of the core principles that would benefit the parties involved, as well as 
the establishment of a set of “practical connecting factors”.22 Compared to contractual obliga-
tions, the non-contractual realm seems to be more complicated, as the parties autonomy of 
choosing the applicable law is restrained to a post facto application.23
This paper briefly discusses the general principles of Rome II Regulation, because traffic 
accidents, even though very practical in nature, are not included amongst the specific provi-
sions that rule upon a given set of torts,24 such as product liability, unfair competition, envi-
ronmental damage, intellectual property rights or industrial action. This means that in order 
to determine the applicable law in a cross-border traffic accident, the general rules of Rome II 
Regulation apply.25
In this context, article 4(1) establishes the general rule for the applicable law in non-con-
tractual obligations and decides that “the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation [...] 
shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs.”26 The Rome II Regulation opts 
therefore for the designation of the place of direct damage as a connecting factor (mostly 
known as lex loci damni or Erfolgsort27). The choice of a lex loci damni comes as well with an 
abandon of the previous principle of lex loci delicti commissi,28 which according to Recital 15 of 
the Regulation, is indeed the common solution in most of the Member States, but its applica-
tion in a context of an Europeanised private international law would endanger the certainty 
as to the law applicable. 
21  Hohloch, G., Place of injury, Habitual Residence, Closer Connections and Substantive Scope – the Basic Principles in Yearbook of Private 
international law, Vol. 9, 2007, pp. 1.–18.
22  Hohloch, op. cit., p. 2. 
23  Article 14 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007. See also Kadner Graziano, T., Freedom to Choose the Applicable law in 
Tort – Articles 14 and 4(3) of the Rome ii Regulation in Ahern, J., and Binchy, W. (eds.), The Rome ii Regulation on the law Applicable 
to non-Contractual Obligations: A new international litigation Regime, 2009 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
24  Articles 5–9 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007. See also Von Hein, J “Article 4 and Traffic Accidents” 
in Ahern, J and Binchy, W. (eds.), The Rome ii Regulation on the law Applicable to non-Contractual Obligations: A new international 
litigation Regime, (2009) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Brière, C “Le règlement (CE) n 864/2007 du 11 juillet 2007 sur la loi 
applicable aux obligations non contractuelles” (2008) 135 Clunet 31; Garcimartín Alférez, F. J “The Rome II Regulation: On the 
way towards a European Private International Law Code” (2007) 7 EuLF 1; Kadner Graziano, T “General Principles of Private 
International Law of Tort in Europe’ in: Basedow et al. (ed), Japanese and european Private international law in Comparative 
Perspective (2008) Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck; Stone, P., “The Rome II Regulation on Choice of Law in Tort” (2007) 4 Ankara L. Rev. 
95–130; Symeonides, S “Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity” (2008) 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 173.
  Von Hein, J., “Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New? Rome II and the European Choice-of-Law Evolution” 
(2008) 82 Tulane L. Rev 1663.
25  Article 4 and 14 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
26  Article 4.1 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
27  See in general Hohloch, op. cit. pp. 1–18; see also Van Calster, op. cit., and Von Hein, J., “Article 4 and Traffic Accidents” in Ahern, 
J and Binchy, W. (eds.), The Rome ii Regulation on the law Applicable to non-Contractual Obligations: A new international litigation 
Regime, 2009 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
28  Van Calster, op. cit., p. 252. The Rome II Regulation expressly ignores the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurs and the country where indirect damage occurs. 
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As such, Rome II Regulation considers itself as the instrument that enhances the predict-
ability of the litigation outcome29 and it specifically instructs to set aside the application of 
lex loci delicti commissi, as well as the law of “the country in which the indirect consequences 
of that event occur”,30 rule similarly applied also by Brussels I, following the Marinari31 judge-
ment. How does all this relate to a victim of a cross-border traffic accident will be explained in 
the next subsections.
2.1. THE GENERAL RULE
A clarification between different concepts, like “event giving rise to damage” versus “dam-
age” as according to the terminology of Article 4 Rome II Regulation, and “harmful event”, as 
referred to Article 5 Brussels I Regulation32 seems pertinent here. Article 4 of Rome II Regula-
tion opts for a more restrictive approach to the term “event”, meaning that it only refers to the 
“place of acting”33 of the tort/delict, whereas in Brussels I, the term comprises both the place 
of acting and of injury.34 In terms of Rome II, therefore, “place of injury” refers to the place 
where the direct damage occurred.35 Although the phrasing of Rome II Regulation is puzzling 
when it comes to the term “damage” as opposed to “injury”, the subsequent clear exclusion 
of the indirect consequences of the event, makes the lex loci damni a generally accepted solu-
tion.36 Practically speaking, if a victim of a cross-border traffic accident that happened in the 
German highways, gets paralyzed as a consequence in his state of origin, say France, the Rome 
II Regulation stipulates that the “damage” was suffered in Germany, where “the victim’s bodily 
integrity was harmed.”37
However, even though the Rome II Regulation does refer to a “general rule” this seems to 
be more or less as a subsidiary solution, given that party autonomy, as set out in Article 14 of 
the same Regulation, prevails. These provisions taken altogether, from a victim’s perspective, 
the lex loci damni solution, according to Van Calster, is a connecting factor that most of the 
29  See Recital 6 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
30  Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
31  Case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v lloyds Bank et al, [1995] ECR I-2719; see also Symeonides, op. cit.
32  Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001/EC on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, (2001) OJ L/12/1.
33  Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 158.
34  See the leading case, Case 21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace [1976] ECR 1735; for a discussion see Mankowski, U and Magnus 
P (eds), Brussels i Regulation, Second revised edition, (2012) Munich, Sellier ELP
35  For a similar wording, see also Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001/EC on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, (2001) OJ L/12/1.
36  Garcimartín Alférez, F. J “The Rome II Regulation: On the way towards a European Private International Law Code” (2007) 7 
EuLF 1; Hay, P., “Contemporary Approaches to Non-Contractual Obligations in Private International Law (Conflict of Laws) and 
the European Community’s “Rome II” Regulation” (2007) 7 EuLF 1.
37  Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 159 and Recital 17 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
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time will lead to the application of the “law of the victim,”38 as opposed to the interests of 
the tortfeasor. In general, there is a feeling that the Rome II Regulation, its general rules, and 
some of the specific rules like environmental damage or product liability, favors the victim 
and/or the consumer, giving to this instrument an overall approach from the point of view of 
the sufferer.39 And indeed, this approach favors what Dickinson labels as the primary objective 
of tort law: the equal distribution of loss among members of society.40
Would we then be pointing out slowly towards a victim-based modernization, insofar as 
Recital 16 of the Rome II Regulation says that: “Uniform rules should enhance the foreseea-
bility of court decisions and ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the person 
claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage. A connection with the country 
where the direct damage occurred (lex loci damni) strikes a fair balance between the interests 
of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage, and also reflects the 
modern approach to civil liability and the development of systems of strict liability.”41 On the 
other hand, due to the fact that tort law and compensation for damage in Member States is 
far from harmonized, it could very well be the case that in cross-border traffic accidents, the 
state where the law of the place of injury (bodily integrity harmed) rather than the law of the 
place of acting (event) favors the victim by providing for higher standards of protection, or 
higher sums paid in compensation, therefore, the generalization that lex loci damni protects 
the victim should not always be taken for granted.42 
To continue this line of thought and as opposed to some Member State’s PIL solutions, like 
Italy or Germany,43 Rome II Regulation does not offer to the victim the possibility of choice 
between “the place of acting and the place of injury”.44 This would, on the contrary, show a 
prevalence of the Savignian paradigm within Rome II, which not always works in favor of the 
victim or the vulnerable party,45 and which prefers to opt for a conflict-of-laws justice rather 
than choosing the application of the law most favorable to the victim.46 Again, this is a some-
how relative truth, since the de facto results of traffic accidents often lead to the same place of 
injury and the place of acting.47
38  Van Calster, op. cit., p. 252. Although, it is unclear what the author means with “law of the victim”: is it the law most favourable 
to the victim or the law of the country where the victim has his/her habitual residence? 
39  Van Calster, op. cit., p. 252.
40  Dickinson, A., The Rome ii Regulation (Oxford, OUP, 2008), at p. 7.
41  Recital 16 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
42  See in general Symeonides, op. cit., p. 173.
43  See for example Article 40(1) of the German EGBGB (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch), for a discussion on 
this see Hay, P., “From Rule-Orientation to “Approach” in German Conflicts Law: The Effect of the 1986 and 1999 Codification” 
(1999) 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 633. For the Italian case, see Article 62 of the law of 31 may 1995, n. 218 (1): Riforma del sistema 
italiano di diritto internazionale private; for a discussion see Giardina, A., “Italy: Law Reforming the Italian System of Private 
International Law” (1996) 35 International Legal Materials, p. 760–782.
44  Von Hein, op. cit., p. 160.
45  Vyshka, op. cit., pp. 533–550.
46  See also Von Hein, op. cit., p. 160.
47  Junker, A “Das Internationale Privatrecht der Straßenverkehrsunfälle nach der Rom II-Verordnung” (2008) 63 JZ, p. 169.
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However, the Savignian roots of Rome II Regulation are clearly distinguished in the choice 
to uphold a unitary connection of a non-contractual obligation to only one legal order, instead 
of practicing the dépeçage.48 In other terms, the applicable law that determines the liability 
of a party is also the law that determines the evaluation of the damages caused (lex causae).49 
Maybe for the sake of simplicity and harmonization, or simply because this solution was al-
ready the one that prevailed in numerous Member States’ national rules50 as well as in inter-
national instruments, such as the Hague Conventions,51 the Commission preferred to submit 
the issues of damages quantifications to the law of the country that determines the liability (in 
other words, the law of the country where the damage has occurred).52
Even though following a unitary approach that would allegedly improve predictability as 
regards the applicable law,53 the lex causae connecting factor in damage quantification does not 
always protect the victim. As it has been developed elsewhere,54 the strict application of the 
Savignian paradigms does not favor an interpretation that would lead towards the best solu-
tion for the victim or the vulnerable party in general. This solution came after the Commission 
decided not to follow the European Parliament’s position, which from its side had proposed a 
dépeçage between the applicable law for the liability and the applicable law for the damages 
quantification.55 Concretely, the Parliament’s proposal stipulated that “in the case of personal 
injuries arising out of traffic accidents [...] with a view to the motor insurance directive, the 
court seized and the liable driver’s insurance shall, for the purposes of determining the type 
of claim for damages and calculating the quantum of the claim, apply the rules of the indi-
vidual’s victim’s place of habitual residence unless it would be inequitable to the victim to do 
so. With regard to liability, the applicable law shall be the law of the place where the accident 
occurred.”56 
The position of the victim is as a consequence, not very clear within the Rome II Regulation. 
What would protect a victim, say if we take a mere example of a person with habitual residence 
in France who suffers damages and losses in Bulgaria, from the potential gap between these 
two countries’ rules and actual costs of medical care in cases of traffic accidents, is only the 
48  Von Hein, op. cit. p. 160; Kozyris, J., Rome ii: Tort Conflicts on the Right Track! A Postscript to Symeon Symeonides’ ‘Missed 
Opportunity’,  Am J. Comp. L, Vol 56, 2008, p. 471; Stone, op. cit., p. 95–130.
49  See Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007, insofar as it says “The law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations under this Regulation shall govern in particular: c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the 
remedy claimed.”
50  See Knetsch, op. cit., p. 979–1018, at p. 985. See also Kadner Graziano, T., la responsabilité délictuelle en droit international privé 
européen (2004), Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Bruylant/LGDJ, at p. 105.
51  Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents; Concluded at The Hague on 4 May 1971 and Convention of 2 October 1973 
on the Law Applicable to Products Liability.
52  See in general, See Knetsch, op. cit. pp. 979–1018.
53  See Nagy, C., op. cit., pp. 93–108.
54  Vyshka, op. cit., pp. 533–550.
55  See Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 July 2005 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EC) 
No .../2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“ROME II”); 
See also Malatesta, A. (ed), The Unification of Choice of law Rules on Torts and Other non-Contractual Obligations in europe (2006) 
Padova, CEDAM, at p. 392. See also Von Hein, op. cit., p. 155.
56  Art 4.2 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
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recital 33 of the Regulation,57 with no binding power. One would say, like for example scholars 
as Symeonides,58 that Rome II does not sound unitary at all and that it even fails its mission of 
assuring more legal certainty in cases of non-contractual obligations and righteously so, since 
the recital 33 uses the phrasing “the court seized should take into account [...].” Whether this 
shows an immature political will to apply in the future a principle of dépeçage only to traffic 
accidents or simply a “political gesture”59 that was enough to satisfy the Parliament, this re-
mains to be seen. 
As a preliminary conclusion and for the time being, I believe that the specificity of 
cross-border traffic accidents does require more harmonization within the European private 
international law, at least in the form of a specific rule within the same Regulation. In this con-
text, the European Parliament’s draft of 200560 might be interesting to refer to, in case one’s 
interests would be full advocacy for the victims and the vulnerable parties’ rights.
2.2  THE GENERAL EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE AND THE ESCAPE 
CLAUSE 
Following the general rule of Rome II Regulation, is the general exception which favors 
the application of the law of the country where both parties “have their habitual residence.”61 
Being a notion that is familiar to many national conflict-of-laws rules,62 the common habitu-
al residence represents the basic effectiveness rationale of the Regulation: in most cases the 
common habitual residence means also lower financial costs for the judicial proceedings, or 
even familiarity with the proceedings, since the judicial system of the place of residence is 
usually best known to the parties.63
Nevertheless, the common habitual residence remains an exception to the general rule, 
again in contrary to the views of the European Parliament’s draft proposal.64 Always in favor 
of a dépeçage between the applicable law determining the liability and the one determining 
the quantification of damages, the European Parliament’s proposed solution of applying the 
57  Recital 33 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007 reads: “According to the current national rules on compensation 
awarded to victims of road traffic accidents, when quantifying damages for personal injury in cases in which the accident takes 
place in a State other than that of the habitual residence of the victim, the court seized should take into account all the relevant 
actual circumstances of the specific victim, including in particular the actual losses and costs of after-care and medical attention.” 
58  Symeonides, op. cit., p. 183.
59  See Knetsch, op. cit., p. 987.
60  Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 July 2005 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 
.../2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“ROME II”).
61  Art 4.2 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
62  Kadner Graziano, T., Gemeineuropäisches internationales Privatrecht, 2002, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, at p. 379–388. See also 
Hohloch, op. cit., pp. 1–18.
63  Dornis, T. W., ’When in Rome, do as the Romans do?’ – A Defense of the lex Domicilii Communis in the Rome ii-Regulation, Eulf, Issue 
4, 2007, I–152, I–157.
64  Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 July 2005 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 
.../2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“ROME II”).
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law of the victim’s habitual residence in the quantification of damages, was not deemed as 
proportional. Even though the interests of the victim need to be protected, the general view65 
was that such a dépeçage would “endanger the tortfeasor’s legitimate interest in foreseeability 
of the applicable law.”66 
And indeed, if we continue the pathway of this scenario, there is also another issue at 
stake, and that is finding the balance between the interests of the victim and the tortfeasor on 
the other side. As such, the tortfeasor could also be held liable and made to pay damages to a 
victim according to the law of a country which he/she could not have anticipated. Should we 
choose to base the applicable law on the habitual residence of the victim, an Italian driver for 
example, that causes injuries to a Slovenian tourist due to a traffic accident in Spain, would be 
held liable according to the Slovenian laws of the damage quantification.67
On the other hand, the possibility of this choice not being always favorable to the victim 
exists, if we were to believe that the amount of damage compensation according to the laws 
of Slovenia is less favorable to the victim than what the Spanish laws would have granted to 
him/her.68 In such cases, the Parliament would empower the courts dealing with the specific 
case to instead apply the law most favorable to the victim.69 As Von Hein righteously pointed 
out, this would have created a “mix of considerations,”70 which alongside the fact that it would 
undermine the legal certainty principle that Rome II Regulation vows to install, it would also 
have introduced a combination of connecting factors exclusively in favor of the victim.71 
Yet again, striking the right balance between the victim and the tortfeasor interests comes 
into play. It is nevertheless undeniable that Rome II Regulation has chosen not to follow the 
so-called Ubiquity theory, rule that has been in place, for example, in Germany since 199972 
and that is based in the principle of applying the law most favorable to the victim, giving the 
freedom of choice between the law of the place of acting and the place of injury, in cases where 
they do not coincide.73 Rome II Regulation seems as such more prone to following the Savigni-
an principles of “conflicts justice” rather than “substantive justice”.74
The establishment of a right balance could be and is beyond doubt difficult, but these gen-
eral observations up until now invite at least to conduct a reflection of what a future and 
65  For a criticism see Malatesta, op. cit. pp. 96-99; Adensamer, M., “Der Verkehrsunfall im Licht der Rom-II-Verordnung”, (2006) 
51 ZVR 523; Staudinger, A., Rome ii and traffic accidents, Eulf, Issue 5, 2005, 1–61. Alternatively, for a positive view on this see 
Bona, M., Personal injuries, Fatal Accidents and Rome ii: Can the law of the Country where the Victim Suffers Provide Full and Fair 
Compensation? in Malatesta, op. cit. 
66  Von Hein, op. cit., p. 161; see also Malatesta, op. cit., p. 98; Adensamer, op. cit. 
67  For other similar examples, see Von Hein, op. cit., p. 161.
68  Adensamer, op. cit. 
69  See in general Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 July 2005 with a view to the adoption of 
Regulation (EC) No .../2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
(“ROME II”), especially the proposed Article 7.
70  Von Hein, op. cit., p. 162.
71  Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 162; see also Malatesta, op. cit., p. 98.
72  See Hohloch, op. cit. pp. 1–18, at p. 8 and Article 40.1 of the German EGBGB.
73  See the Explanatory Memorandum for the Commission’s draft for a Rome II Regulation of 2003, Brussels, 22.7.2003 COM 
(2003) 427 final 2003/0168 (COD).
74  Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 162.
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“upgraded” Rome II could look like. For the time being, the victim can only rely, as mentioned 
before, to the Recital 33, of the Regulation, which merely instructs the competent court to 
take into account the actual losses suffered from the injured party.75 Whether this solution 
from the side of the European legislator is ultimately put into question by the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU), with its Odenbreit76 jurisprudence, this will be the question that we will try 
to answer in the second section of this paper, alongside a discussion for the reformation of 
Rome II Regulation. 
To continue the purposes of this section, Article 4 of Rome II Regulation in a methodo-
logical point of view, sets up a general rule, then a general exception to the general rule and 
ultimately, an escape clause where it stipulates that “where [...] the tort is manifestly more 
closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that 
other country shall apply.”77 No doubt that the expression “manifestly more connected” leaves 
room for different interpretations and one of the problems that could be identified in this 
regard78 are cases that include a rental car.79 A classic case to refer to comes from UK’s national 
jurisdiction, with edmunds v Simmonds80 where two persons having their habitual residence in 
England rented a car registered and insured in Spain. 
The claimant then suffered damages because of the respondent’s negligent driving. The 
question was whether to apply Spanish law,81 or alternatively, as the Queen’s Bench Division 
decided, to apply English law instead. According to the court, even though the car was reg-
istered and insured in Spain “that was not of overwhelming weight”82 and that the insurers 
“had to contemplate”83 that due to the touristic nature of the area, the majority of their clients 
would be foreigners and hence, the quantification of damages could be made by another sys-
tem of law rather than the Spanish one.
A problem here,84 with the connecting factors in hire car cases, seems to be the differences 
between national rules of damages quantifications. In edmunds v Simmonds Spanish law did 
indeed foresee much lower damages for the injured party than English law.85 If the local in-
surance policy concluded with the rental of the car does not cover the difference between the 
two, the driver could potentially face the obligation to pay to the victim large sums of money. 
Therefore, as Von Hein suggests, in order to ensure that neither party gets overburdened, in 
75  See in general Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit.; See also Symeonides, op. cit. 
76  Case C463/06 Odenbreit, ECLI:EU:C:2007:792.
77  Art 4.3 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007; on the interpretation of this article, see in particular Fentiman, 
R “The Significance of Close Connection” in Ahern, J. and Binchy, W. (eds.), The Rome ii Regulation on the law Applicable to non-
Contractual Obligations: A new international litigation Regime, (2009) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
78  Von Hein, op. cit., p. 166.
79  Sieghörtner, R., internationaler Mietwagenunfall – Zulassungsort als relevantes Anknüpfungskriterium?, NZV, Issue 16, 2003, p 105.
80  Case (2001) 1 WLR 1003 (Queen’s Bench).
81  Article 3 Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents; Concluded at The Hague on 4 May 1971. Spain is a party to the 
Convention.
82  (2001) 1 WLR 1003, at 1004.
83  ibid.
84  Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 167.
85  Case (2001) 1 WLR 1003. 
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such scenarios the escape clause could be triggered, with the justification that the country 
where the insurance policy is concluded has a manifestly closer connection to the tort than the 
country of common habitual residence.86 Nevertheless, the scenario becomes even more intri-
cate if we realize that, as a party to the Hague Convention, Spanish courts would prioritize the 
application of the Article 3 of the Convention instead. 
This brings us to one of the major problems encountered in Rome II Regulation: its co-ex-
istence with international conventions.87 Rome II Regulation strives to improve legal certainty 
and predictability of non-contractual obligations, but, as a number of scholars have righteous-
ly pointed out,88 the Regulation might be simply “flattering itself”.89 As the next sections of 
this paper will point out, Rome II Regulation co-exists with the Hague Convention on the law 
applicable to traffic accidents (1971),90 which potentially gives rise to a patchwork of different 
connecting factors for the same situation, which would then lead to different applicable laws. 
The picture becomes even more complicated when we consider that the Motor Insurance Di-
rectives91 (MIDs) are also applicable.92 
2.3  ARTICLE 28 OF THE ROME II REGULATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE HAGUE CONVENTION
What Rome II is striving to achieve is the predictability and certainty as to the law appli-
cable,93 clearly following the rationales on the basis of which Savigny94 founded the conflict-
of-laws approach, one of which is the consistency of international decisions on private inter-
national law. Despite the will to ensure the uniform application of conflicts-of-laws, the pic-
ture in the European Union legal order is also dominated by other instruments which remain 
pertinent. In case of traffic accidents, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic 
Accidents (hereinafter The Hague Convention), remains in force and could potentially prevail 
over the Rome II Regulation, in the Member States that have ratified it (not less than 12).95
Article 28 of Rome II Regulation provides that it “shall not prejudice the application of 
international conventions to which one or more Member States are parties [...] when this 
86  Von Hein, op. cit., p. 167; See also Staudinger, op. cit.
87  Article 28 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007. 
88  Nagy, op. cit., pp. 93–108; Graziano, op. cit., pp. 425–429; Papettas, op. cit., pp. 297–321; Garriga, G., Relationships between Rome 
ii and other international instruments, a commentary on Article 28 of the Rome ii Regulation in Yearbook of Private international law, 
Volume 9, 2007, pp. 137–148.
89  Nagy, op. cit., p. 93.
90  Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents; Concluded at The Hague on 4 May 1971.
91  Council Directives 72/166/EEC [1972] OJ l103\ 84/5/EEC [1984] OJ l8/17) 90/232/EEC [1990] OJ L129/33; 2000/26/EC 
[2000] OJ L181/65 and 2005/14/EC [2005] OJ L149/14, consolidated in Directive 2009/103/EC [2009] OJ L263/11.
92  An analysis of the MIDs is not in the scope of this article, for the sake of brevity, but see for this Papettas, op. cit., pp. 297–321.
93  Recital 6 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
94  Von Savigny, K., “A Treatise on the Conflict of laws” (1849), translation of William Guthrie (1869)
95  Countries where the Hague Convention is in force can be found on https://www.hcch.net/fr/states/hcch-members. 
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Regulation is adopted and which lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to non-contractual 
obligations.”96 The exception that follows in paragraph 2 does not save the situation, since the 
Regulation is to take precedence over the international instruments, only if these are conclud-
ed exclusively between two or more MS.97 Rome II as such does not take precedence over The 
Hague Convention, since a few members to it, are not EU member states.98 In this scenario, 
the question of legal uncertainty, but also of forum shopping99 becomes a real threat. 
In order to understand the possible gaps between the two regimes applicable in the territo-
ry of the EU, let us briefly explain the scheme comprised in The Hague Convention. Firstly, the 
Convention’s general rule defines as the applicable law, the internal law of the State where the 
accident occurred100 and rests as such upon the principle lex loci delicti commissi. Even though 
the Rome II Regulation has narrowed down its general connecting factor, from the place of 
injury to the place of direct damage, applying as such the lex loci damni, both of these instru-
ment’s general rules lead in most of the cases to the designation of the same applicable law, 
since in most traffic accidents, the place of injury and the place of direct damage coincide. 
Differences exist, nevertheless, in the instruments’ exceptions rules. As such, the Hague Con-
vention does not recognize at all the connecting factor of common habitual residence of the 
parties, but rests in the principle of the legal domicile of the vehicle, also not at all used by the 
Rome II Regulation.101
Even though the above-mentioned clashes might apply finally to a minority of all the 
cross-border traffic accidents happening in the EU, the main purpose of Rome II Regulation 
seems to seriously be at a risk. In this legal landscape, as it is also constantly recalled by dif-
ferent scholars,102 Rome II Regulation has not been entirely successful in ensuring the harmo-
nization of conflict-of-laws for non-contractual obligations.103 The fact that the above-men-
tioned applicable instruments in the field of traffic accidents might lead to the application of 
different internal laws, raises considerable challenges that both the victim and the tortfeasor 
(and his/her insurer) need to face.
From this perspective, and taking into consideration that the legal certainty about the 
applicable law is in the interests of all parties, be it a victim, an insurer or a tortfeasor,104 this 
article recalls that a denunciation of the Hague Convention could be an appropriate solution105 
96  Article 28 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
97  idem, paragraph 2.
98  Like for example Switzerland, the Balkans countries etc., see https://www.hcch.net/fr/states/hcch-members.
99  See amongst others Nagy, op. cit., pp. 93–108.
100  Article 3 Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents; Concluded at The Hague on 4 May 1971.
101  Article 4 of Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents; Concluded at The Hague on 4 May 1971.
102  See for example Nagy, op. cit.; Garriga, op. cit., pp. 137–148. 
103  It is not the scope of this paper, but we remind that there exists also The Hague Convention on product liability, Convention of 
2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. 
104  Von Hein, op. cit. p. 157; see also Hague Conference on Private International Law, Overview of The Hague Convention of 4 May 
1971 on the law Applicable to Traffic Accidents (2008).
105  Garriga, op. cit., p. 145. See also Pataut E, «De Bruxelles à La Haye, Droit international privé communautaire et Droit international 
conventionnel», in: Mélanges P. lagarde, Paris (2005), at p. 675–676; Brière, C., les conflits de conventions internationales en droit 
privé, Paris (2001), at p. 68 and p. 76.
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to finalize the mission of the harmonization of conflict-of-law rules in non-contractual obliga-
tions in the EU. This would avoid unnecessary burdens and confusion in cases where the appli-
cable laws differ for the same situation, it would also avoid forum shopping and the “complex 
conflict-of-laws system”106 created by the Hague Convention, which at the same time, could 
also be considered as “outdated”.107
Until this happens, we could nevertheless imagine a possible “way out” from the applica-
tion of the Hague Convention over the Rome II Regulation.108 This is enshrined in the Article 
14 of Rome II Regulation: the principle of party autonomy.109 Even though not a very popular 
principle in non-contractual obligations110 and considered as under the risk to remain a “dead 
letter,”111 especially ex post party autonomy might be used from the parties to choose a com-
mon applicable law, even where there are cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Hague 
Convention.112 As such, the French Court of Cassation and the Austrian Supreme Court have 
decided to allow the application of party autonomy, according to the national PIL rules, even 
though the Hague Convention would be considered as applicable.113 And indeed, Article 14 
Rome II Regulation could be indeed used as an effective tool to ensure the harmony of the 
decisions between the two different legal orders for traffic accidents in the EU.114
3. INCONVENIENCIES AND EVOLUTIONS
While the main function of Rome II Regulation is largely accepted as being the determi-
nation of the “applicable law”115 to non-contractual obligations, this section aims to analyze 
and understand the global approach of the Rome II and the methodology of determining such 
applicable law, towards the vulnerable parties, or in other terms, the victims of cross-border 
traffic accidents. Until now, this article has shown that the co-existence of Rome II Regulation 
and The Hague Convention could lead, although in a small number of cases, into the appli-
cation of different substantive laws for the same situation, not answering as such the main 
objective of Rome II: legal predictability. 
106  Garriga, op. cit., p. 145.
107  The Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents was concluded at The Hague on 4 May 1971.
108  For this issue, see also Von Hein, op. cit., p. 158.
109  Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
110  See in general Kadner Graziano, Freedom to Choose…, op. cit.; see also Miaja de la Muela, A., Derecho internacional privado, Tomo 
segundo, parte especial, 10th in Bouza Vidal (ed.), Madrid (1987).
111  Kadner Graziano, Freedom to Choose…, op. cit., p. 114.
112  See Case Cour de cassation, chambre civile Audience publique du mardi 19 Avril 1988 in France and Austrian Supreme Court 
(OGH) 26 January 1995, (1995) in Austria.
113  See Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 170.
114  Rather 3, since Denmark is not bound by the Rome II Regulation, see Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 158.
115  Mills, A., “The Application of Multiple Laws Under the Rome II Regulation” in Ahern, J. and Binchy, W. (eds.), The Rome ii 
Regulation on the law Applicable to non-Contractual Obligations: A new international litigation Regime, (2009) Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers at p. 133.
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Another “inconvenience” for the vulnerable parties could come from the choice of the 
European legislator to use the lex causae connecting factor to the quantification of damages, 
instead of practicing the dépeçage, or basically the application of multiple laws according to 
different elements of the tort. 
What would then an application of the dépeçage principle entail and would it be suitable 
to envision a reform of the Rome II Regulation? Private international law rules are not the 
simplest ones to draft, as there are many elements to take into account such as simplicity, 
legal certainty, a convenient degree of flexibility, harmonization of international decisions, 
taking into account the party autonomy, if there is any, and a lot more elements of these kind 
that make striking a balance between different interests a real challenge. This section aims 
therefore to showcase whether Rome II should allow the application of multiple applicable 
laws, also taking into account the Odenbreit jurisprudence, as another example of what one 
could call the CJEU’s judicial activism116 and from there explain the new elements that the use 
of forum actoris is bringing to the evolution of private international law in the EU. 
It would be interesting if we could make the matters more tangible by providing examples, 
but after a while, we would realize that the interplay between the applicable laws of Rome II, 
The Hague Convention and the different exceptions to the rule, other than being arbitrary, are 
also confusing and equally unfavorable or favorable to the victim. For instance, take a Sloveni-
an tourist in France, who becomes a victim of a traffic accident. Upon his return to his Member 
State of origin, he would be able to seize the national courts and to sue directly the insurer of 
the tortfeasor (provided that this is allowed by the law applicable to the non-contractual ob-
ligation or by the law applicable to the insurance contract).117 The Slovenian court would then 
apply the law of the state where the accident occurred, in other words the substantive French 
law in order to determine the tortfeasor civil liability and the quantification of damages for 
the victim. Between the Dintilhac nomenclature118 and the Mornet referential,119 the Sloveni-
an judge, maybe unfamiliar with French law, may indeed experience some practical problems, 
but the overall method of damage quantification could in the end be favorable to the victim, if 
we agree arbitrarily that the compensation sums are more elevated in France than in Slovenia. 
However, if the same tourist happens to have the accident in a country neighbor to France, 
say Germany, the law applicable would be the somehow strict substantive German law,120 both 
to the determination of civil liability and to the quantification of damages, provided that the 
court of the lex fori does not find that the tort is “manifestly more closely connected” with the 
substantive law of another country.121 Or alternatively, say a French tourist that suffers the 
same accident, but in Slovenia, could find himself or herself reimbursed according to Sloveni-
an substantive law. 
116  See Vyshka, op. cit., p. 541.
117  Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
118  Dintilhac J. P. (ed.), Rapport du groupe de travail chargé d’élaborer une nomenclature des préjudices corporels La Doc. Française (2005).
119  Mornet, B l’indemnisation des préjudices en cas de blessures ou de décès (2018) at http://www.ajdommagecorporel.fr/sites/www.
ajdommagecorporel.fr/files/fichier-cv/RPC-BM-septembre%20 20 18.pdf.
120  See for more on this Knetsch, op. cit., p. 989.
121  Article 4.3 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
152
PRAVNI VJESNIK GOD. 36 BR. 3-4, 2020.
In any example that we might think of, there will be a degree of dissatisfaction according 
to the situation that the parties find themselves. In the first case, the Slovenian tourist would 
be happy to receive a greater amount of compensation according to the French law, but in the 
second one, the strict German rules might not be very welcomed. The application of a “harmo-
nized” conflict-of-laws rule can effectively lead to inconsistencies, according to the economic 
and social differences between Member States of the European Union.122 When the French 
court finds itself, as per the above-mentioned example, obliged to apply the foreign Slovenian 
substantive laws of damage quantification, a question that would normally rise is: how to 
avoid and circumvent the determination of Slovenian law as the applicable law?
A few options arise in this regard. The first one is following the example of the English 
characterization of damage quantification as a “procedural matter”.123 A procedural character-
ization would in other words mean that the lex fori will be applicable to a part of the case (i.e. 
the quantification of damages) “without any reference to the rules of other jurisdictions that 
have contact with the parties and the transaction.”124 
Thus, if we take the example of Chaplin v. Boys,125 a British citizen had caused corporal 
damage to another British citizen during their stay in Malta. The law of the country where 
the damage occurred, that is Maltese law, did not provide damages for pain and suffering, as 
it is provided alternatively in English law.126 Even though the conflict-of-laws at the time was 
lex loci delicti, which would lead to the designation of Maltese law as applicable to the damage 
quantification, the English court decided nonetheless to apply English law instead. The result 
was inherently the same, but the arguments different. For example, the Lords Donovan and 
Guest argued that the damage quantification for pain and suffering was a procedural issue and 
governed as such by the lex fori.127 On the other hand, Lord Pearson thought that the damages 
should not be characterized as procedural, but that English law should be nevertheless appli-
cable to the damage quantification since the plaintiff is suing in England after all.128 Never-
theless, as it stands, some scholars believe that it would be a mistake to characterize the issue 
of damage quantifications as a procedural one, since problems of forum shopping might arise 
stronger than ever.129 Moreover, a classification as procedural of the issues of damage quantifi-
cation would be contrary to the Article 15 of the Rome II Regulation, which states clearly that 
the assessment of damage is governed by this present Regulation.130 
Secondly, Rome II in Article 26 provides that “the application of a provision of the law of 
any country specified by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifest-
122  Knetsch, op. cit., p. 989; Rigaux, F. and Fallon, M., Droit international privé, Larcier (2005).
123  See Weintraub, R., “Discretion versus Strict Rules in the field of Cross-Border Torts” (2005) at https://dianawallis.org.uk/cy/
document/seminar-14-march/weintraub-discretion-vs-strict-rules-in-the-field-of-cross-border-torts#documentp 3. 
124  See Weintraub, op. cit., p. 3; See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Para. 122 comment b (1971) and Case Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107 (1945).
125  See Case Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356.
126  For a comment on this see Reese, W. L. M., Choice of law in Tort Cases. Chaplin v. Boys (england: Court of Appeal and House of lords), 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 189–194.
127  Case Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356, at 382 and 383.
128  Case Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356, at 398.
129  See Weintraub, op. cit., p. 7.
130  Knetsch, op. cit., p. 991.
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ly incompatible with the public policy of the forum.”131 However, it does not seem probable 
that a court will refuse the application of a foreign law only because it does not sufficiently 
compensate the victim, as it would be according to the law of the forum. Moreover, according 
to a view in scholarship,132 the concept of public policy in private international law is going 
through a period of “erosion”, its scope of application being narrowed down more and more 
each year.133 In the end, public policy remains a tool that could be potentially used to apply the 
law of the forum instead, but de facto, it seems that Article 26 Rome II Regulation will simply 
remain dead letter.
A somewhat more feasible option could be relying on that little flexibility that Rome II 
provides and the use of its escape clause. If we turn to the previously mentioned hire car case 
in edmunds v. Simmonds134 there is a risk for the driver to not be covered in total by the local 
insurance policy, if the Court designs as applicable law British law according to the common 
habitual residence rule (Article 4.2 Rome II Regulation).135 Academics in this case tend to ar-
gue that the place of registration of the vehicle could lead to the consideration of the tort ul-
timately as “manifestly more connected”136 to the country of registration than to the country 
of common habitual residence. Even though it might sound an overarching interpretation, it 
still exists as a possibility. In any case, Rome II Regulation, even though use the strict terms 
of “manifestly more closely connected” it also states that this might be based “in particular” 
on pre-existing relationships between the parties. With this interpretation, seems like the 
competent Court’s discretion plays also a major role.
With somehow a vague exception of the third “way out”, the main position is that remedies 
to the problems posed by the application of the lex causae to the quantification of damages 
are quite limited.137 Victims and vulnerable parties up until this analysis can be susceptible 
to suffer from legal insecurity. Nevertheless, in the next subsections, this article explores the 
evolutions in the non-contractual obligations in the EU, following the influence of the CJEU 
with its Odenbreit jurisprudence as a quite liberal and victim-centered approach and on the 
possibility of applying the principle of dépeçage to dissociate the applicable laws for the dam-
age quantification on one hand and for the civil responsibility on the other.
3.1  APPLICABILITY OF MULTIPLE LAWS
Dépeçage, or else known as issue by issue analysis138 is a term used to express the availa-
bility of using multiple applicable laws to govern different and distinct elements of a non-con-
131  Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
132  Knetsch, op. cit., p. 990.
133  ibid.
134  See section 2.b of this article. 
135  Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit., p. 167; see also Staudinger, A “Rome II and traffic accidents” (2005) 5 EuLF 1–61.
136  Von Hein, op. cit., p. 167.
137  Knetsch, op. cit., p. 992.
138  For more on this see Mills, The Application…, op. cit. 
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tractual obligation. For example, as it was mentioned earlier in this article, a dépeçage would 
mean applying different laws for the issue of defining the civil liability of the tortfeasor and 
for the distinct issue of subsequently determining the modalities or availability of damages for 
the same non-contractual obligation.
The dépeçage is plainly prohibited by the Rome II Regulation and not only in its general 
rule in Article 4, applicable to traffic accidents, but also in other special provisions, like prod-
uct liability in Article 5139 or unjust enrichment, in Article 10.140 However, when drafting the 
Rome II provisions, the idea of allowing issue by issue analysis was not entirely off the table, as 
the European Parliament’s draft provided that “in resolving the question of the applicable law, 
the court seized shall, where necessary, subject each specific issue of the dispute to separate 
analysis.”141 For the EP and more specifically for its Committee on Legal Affairs, the essential 
would be that “the courts are provided with a clear instrument which allows them the neces-
sary flexibility in order to do justice to parties in individual cases.”142
Confronting on the other hand, the Commission’s proposal that did not include any provi-
sion for an issue by issue analysis,143 this view of the European Parliament seems interesting 
if one would envision the need for a reform in the Rome II Regulation. First of all, dépeçage 
should not be considered as a “device through which courts can avoid unattractive applicable 
laws”144 Private international law provisions are generally conceptualized as purely objective 
norms that do not take into account the end results of the application of different substantive 
laws, but it seems that into its proposal, the EP was largely influenced by the United States 
concept of conflict-of-law rules: an outcome-based analysis. That is why, like Von Hein,145 we 
tend to believe that the final outcome of Rome II responds in priority to the “conflicts justice” 
instead of material or substantive justice.146
The outcome-based analysis is what actually founded the US conflict-of-laws revolution147 
and the EP proposal suggested that at least the same attempt was made for the European 
Union. However, a European court’s discretion to choose between applicable laws with a tele-
139  Article 5.2 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007. 
140  Article 10.4 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007. 
141  Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 July 2005 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EC) 
No .../2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“ROME II”) at 
Article 4.4.
142  See European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) (COM (2003)0427 – C5-0338/2003 – 
2003/0168(COD)) Amendment 38.
143  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”) 22. 7. 2003 COM (2003) 427 final, 2003/0168.
144  Mills, The Application…, op. cit., p. 138.
145  Von Hein, Article 4…, op. cit.
146  See also Symeonides, S., “American Conflicts Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century” (2000) 37 Willamette L. Rev. 1; Symeonides, 
Rome II…, op. cit. 
147  See Cavers, D. F., “A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem” (1933) 47 Harvard L. Rev. 173; see also in general, Symeonides, S., 
The American Choice of law Revolution: Past, Present and Future, (2006) Brill.
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ological end in mind is hardly accepted by the Member States.148 Moreover, since the Regula-
tion’s main objectives were (and continue to be) legal predictability and certainty, the issue of 
dépeçage was rapidly seen as inconsistent.149
However, the fact that dépeçage has been an issue of discussion, encourages us in this 
paper to explore the opportunities and ideas for a possible step further in the Rome II Reg-
ulation. It would be necessary nevertheless, to strike a balance between vulnerable parties’ 
protection and policy uncertainty, which dépeçage undoubtedly gives rise to. If we take the ex-
ample of the USA, it was popular amongst the critics of the lex loci delicti connecting factor and 
the part of academia that promoted the “interest analysis”150 of a specific case to campaign for 
the use of the dépeçage principle.151 Nevertheless, it not impossible to rely upon the dépeçage 
and also to follow the interests of no party in particular, in circumstances where the conflict-
of-laws is based only on objective connecting factors, as it is usually the case.152
Uncertainty has reigned upon the dépeçage in conflict-of-laws rules,153 but the overall ex-
clusion of it from the Rome II Regulation might have not been the right decision. According 
to Symeonides,154 for example, a great opportunity for revolutionizing the conflict-of-laws in 
Europe was clearly missed. There would also be, in this regard, insufficiency as to the flexibility 
of the rules in Rome II. In a critique of the general rule, Symeonides believes that Article 4.1 
and 4.2 of the Regulation can deliver unsuitable results and that Article 4.3 would be deemed 
as applicable in very few cases, since it is unclear what and how “a manifestly more connected” 
country would emerge in a non-contractual obligation. As accepted earlier in this paper, Arti-
cle 4.3 risks remaining a dead letter provision, due to its inflexibility and narrowness.155 In this 
regard, dépeçage would come to rescue because arguably, an element of the non-contractual 
obligation, like the damage quantification, could be more connected with the legal order of a 
specific country, than the whole and undivided non-contractual obligation.156
On the other hand, the argument that there should be only one applicable law to govern all 
the elements of the non-contractual obligation prevails and is stronger than ever.157 Mills for 
example, illustrates this choice by explaining that the same law should be applicable to liability 
and damages, because most of the cases, the tort policies of a country, have a balance between 
148  Mills, The Application…, op. cit., p. 139.
149  idem. Though it is interesting, because Rome II still allows the application of previous international instruments, like Hague 
Conventions via Article 28, which as this article testifies, does not answer to the objectives of legal predictability and certainty. 
150  See Mills, The Application…, op. cit., p. 143. 
151  See for example the American Law Institute’s First Restatement of Conflict of laws in 1934, section 377; see also Mills, op. cit., p. 
143. For an overview on dépeçage see Stevenson, C. G., “Dépeçage: Embracing Complexity to Solve Choice-of-Law Issues” (2003) 
37 Indiana L. Rev. 303; Reese, W. L. M., “Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law” (1973) 73 Columbia L. Rev. 58; 
Ena, M., “Choice of Law and Predictability of Decisions in Products Liability Cases (2007) 34 Fordham Urban L. J. 1417; see also 
Wilde, C. L., “Dépeçage in the Choice of Tort Law” (1968) 41 S. California L. Rev. 329.
152  Mills, op. cit., p. 143. 
153  Mills, op. cit., p. 144.
154  See in general Symeonides, op. cit., p. 173.
155  See also Mills, The Application…, op. cit., p. 145 
156  Carruthers, J and Crawford, E., Variations on a Theme of Rome ii. Reflections on Proposed Choice of law Rules for non-Contractual 
Obligations: Part ii, (2005) 9 Edinburgh L. Rev. 238.
157  Mills, op. cit., p. 146.
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these two elements: a low threshold of liability would entail low damages and vice-versa.158 
While this is of course true, in cross-border traffic accidents one cannot insist upon the fact 
that differences between EU Member States’ healthcare costs for example, should completely 
be left aside. It sounds logical that an injured French tourist while in Slovenia should be reim-
bursed according to the costs of the healthcare system that he belongs to in his state of origin.
In these cases, this article suggests that the use of dépeçage could be a good mean to en-
sure proper compensation for the injured party, “by allowing for the application of a different 
applicable law to the question of damages.”159 This, in other terms, would simply require a 
formalization of Recital 33 previously mentioned, which per se is an unsatisfactory solution 
to the EP’s proposal, due to its non-binding and merely descriptive nature. The present choices 
therefore do not seem satisfactory, especially in the light of enhanced protection for the in-
jured party that the Odenbreit jurisprudence brings upon the table. 
3.2.  FORUM ACTORIS – EVOLUTIONS IN EUROPEAN PIL 
From the above analysis, it seems perfectly normal that the judicial policy of Rome II will 
have its critics. The application of a unique law to the determination of the civil liability and 
to the quantification of damages cannot be freely disregarded by the competent court. On 
the other hand, the liberal (and somehow activist) approach of the CJEU in determining the 
jurisdiction and in establishing the right for a direct action of a third party (forum actoris) in 
the courts of a Member State where he/she is domiciled, it seems to us, like a preliminary 
conclusion, that the CJEU is pointing out towards a more liberal and flexible new approach for 
the Rome II Regulation. 
As such, in the Odenbreit160 case, the CJEU decided that Article 9(1) of Brussels I Regu-
lation on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters is to 
be interpreted as meaning that “the injured party [should be permitted] to bring an action 
directly against the insurer before the courts for the place in a Member State where the injured 
party is domiciled, provided that a direct action is permitted and the insurer is domiciled in a 
Member State.”161 
Now, it is true that between an insurance company and its insureds, the insurance policy 
commonly includes a jurisdiction clause, which nevertheless, is not to be deemed as binding 
upon injured third parties, as recently decided by CJEU in Assens Havn v navigators Manage-
ment.162 The jurisprudence of CJEU in this regard, seems to point out that insurance companies 
do not have unlimited control over the Member States’ jurisdictions that will be potentially 
seized by an injured third party to hear the claim, nor can they be sure that the jurisdiction 
158  ibid. 
159  ibid. 
160  Case C-463/06 Odenbreit, ECLI:EU:C:2007:792.
161  Case C-463/06 Odenbreit, ECLI:EU:C:2007:792, para. 31.
162  Case C-368/16 Assens Havn ECLI:EU:C:2017:546.
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clauses included in the insurance policy will be found applicable. Therefore, the implications 
for insurance companies as well should not be overlooked. 
For instance, in the Assens Havn case, (even though it is not a case involving a traffic ac-
cident, the same reasoning can be applied by analogy) a Swedish vessel that was insured by 
Navigators Management, a British insurance company, caused damage to a quay in Denmark. 
The Danish owner directly sued the insurance company in its Member State of residence, only 
to find out that the Danish courts, in first instance, dismissed the action on the grounds that 
the insurance policy between the tortfeasor and Navigators Management provided for exclu-
sive competence of the English jurisdiction.
The Danish Supreme court, then asked a preliminary question to the CJEU, asking whether 
the provisions of such insurance policies were also binding for a third party. For the CJEU, 
this matter was long discussed with the case Société financière et industrielle du Peloux v AXA 
Belgium163 and it simply proceeded with “extending” the reasoning to injured third parties 
who bring a direct action against the insurer. The Court’s commitment to the protection of 
weaker parties can be seen especially where it states that “the situation of a third party victim 
of insured damage is even farther removed from the contractual relationship that an insured 
beneficiary who did not expressly consent to that agreement.”164 In a nutshell, the provisions 
of a specific court’s jurisdiction on an insurance policy are not binding towards an injured third 
party, which is a good step forward into ensuring the third parties’ adequate protection.
On the other hand, this certainly means that insurance companies domiciled the EU can be 
found with an obligation to respond to a direct action in front of virtually all jurisdictions of 
EU Member States, according to the place where their insureds caused damage. As such, they 
cannot rely upon their insurance policy provisions on a specific jurisdiction when trying to 
evade the application of an unfamiliar national jurisdiction.165
The protection of injured parties or “contractually weaker parties”166 has indeed been one 
of the priorities of CJEU in examining a considerable number of judgements in the field of 
conflict-of-laws and jurisdiction.167 As it has been clear up until now in principle the weaker 
parties enjoy a right of forum actoris that is the right to bring direct action against an insurer 
before the courts of habitual residence.168 Ultimately they are also protected from actions ini-
tiated by the insurer, since the insurers can bring “proceedings only in the courts of the Mem-
163  Case C-112/03 Société financière et industrielle du Peloux ECLI:EU:C:2005:280.
164  Case C-368/16 Assens Havn ECLI:EU:C: 2017:546, at para. 39. 
165  Moreover, this is against the principles of effectiveness of Brussels I and violates the mutual trust between Member States, see 
Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit ECLI:EU:C:2004:228.
166  Dominelli, S., Direct Actions of ‘injured Parties’ in the Brussels ia Regulation: The Pawel Hofsoe Case of the Court of Justice of the 
european Union as an expression of legal Pragmatism, EuLF, Issue 2, 2018, 29–60, at p. 30.
167  See in general Case C-463/06, FBTO Schadeverzekeringen nV v Jack Odenbreit; Case C-347/08 Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse 
v WGV-Schwäbische Allgemeine Versicherungs AG; Case C-111/09 ýeská podnikatelská pojišĢovna as, Vienna insurance Group v 
Michal Bilas; Case C-521/14 SOVAG – Schwarzmeer und Ostsee Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft v if Vahinkovakuutusyhtiö Oy; Case 
C-340/16 landeskrankenanstalten-Betriebsgesellschaft – KABeG v Mutuelles du Mans assurances – MMA iARD SA; Case C-368/16 
Assens Havn v navigators Management (UK) limited. Specifically, for direct actions see Joined Cases C-359/14 and C-475/14, 
“eRGO insurance” Se v “if P&C insurance” AS and “Gjensidige Baltic” AAS v “PZU lietuva” UAB DK; Case C-240/14 eleonore Prüller-
Frey v norbert Brodnig and Axa Versicherung AG.
168  See also Dominelli, op. cit., p. 30.
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ber State in which the defendant is domiciled.”169 The concept of an “injured party” is present 
therefore in Brussels Ia Regulation, where the right to a forum actoris is expressly provided.170 
However, Brussels Ia seems to remain silent (and the CJEU continued this silence)171 in mat-
ters determining which forum can the injured party seize. Can it be “their own protective 
forum”172 or are there options in choosing between the courts of their habitual residence or 
the courts of the country where the insurer is domiciled. Practically, in Brussels Ia Regulation, 
direct action is allowed only where “such direct actions are permitted”,173 but which law should 
recognize a direct action is still unclear.174 Where applicable, the rules of Rome II Regulation 
seem to be more specific: a direct action is possible if recognized by the law applicable to the 
non-contractual obligation or by the law applicable to the insurance contract.175 
This brings us to Article 18 of Rome II Regulation, the provision expressly regulating the 
right of direct action in non-contractual obligations: “The person having suffered damage may 
bring his or her claim directly against the insurer of the person liable to provide compensation 
if the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation or the law applicable to the insurance 
contract so provides.”176 Different interpretations of this article circulate in the academic de-
bate. There are scholars that think of this provision as a complimentary rule, where applicable, 
to the Brussels Ia vague approach on direct actions,177 but there is also the feeling that this 
provision seems to be ambiguous and somewhat unhelpful.”178 
In a very direct interpretation, the provision does not say much as regards the applicable 
law for the whole action, but it simply sets out the applicable law that would permit the exist-
ence or not of a right for direct action.179 If the provision was to be read as containing a real 
choice-of-law for the injured party between the law applicable to the non-contractual obliga-
tion or the law applicable to the insurance contract,180 the situation becomes much more inter-
esting. Since the first scenario is pretty much the rule (the MIDs oblige EU Member States to 
169  Article 14 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 
(Brussels Ia) OJ L 351/1, 20. 12. 2012. 
170  Article 13.2 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (Brussels Ia) OJ L 351/1, 
20. 12. 2012.
171  Dominelli, op. cit., p. 30.
172  ibid.
173  Art 13.2 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (Brussels Ia) OJ L 351/1, 20. 12. 
2012. 
174  This brings us to the applicable rules of Rome II regulation in art 18, to be discussed further in this article. See also Dominelli, 
op. cit., p. 30.
175  See Case C-240/14 eleonore Prüller-Frey v norbert Brodnig and Axa Versicherung AG, para. 37.
176  Article 18 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ l 199, 31. 7. 2007.
177  See in general Dominelli, op. cit., pp. 29–60.
178  Papettas, op. cit., p. 308.
179  ibid.
180  As it is read by, amongst others, Dickinson, A The Rome ii Regulation the law Applicable to non-Contractual Obligations (2008) 
Oxford University Press; Von Hein, op. cit.
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recognize the right of a direct action),181 the injured party would have the possibility to choose 
between the two scenarios, the “law which is more favorable to him”182 leading therefore to 
the possibility of an alternative connection. The CJEU has not yet interpreted this provision, 
but this might be at least the tendency in which it will lean upon, since it is the interpretation 
most favorable to the victim.
Another issue that relates to Article 18, regardless to its interpretation as establishing a 
choice for the victim or simply creating a right of direct action in non-contractual obligation, is 
the relationship of the insurer with the insurance policy (contract) and the tortuous event.183 
Normally, in a scenario of a direct action, the non-contractual obligation will fall into the scope 
of Rome II Regulation, but would the insurer be allowed to rely on the provisions of the con-
tract that set out another competent jurisdiction?184 The answer seems simple, if we consider 
that Assens Havn case applies by analogy, but this still remains an open question.185 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the situation of the injured parties and of the victims as regards their protection 
in cases of cross-border traffic accidents, as governed by the rules of European private interna-
tional law (Rome II Regulation overwhelmingly), does not appear to be entirely satisfactory. 
First of all, the objectives of legal predictability and certainty are clearly put into question with 
the co-existence between Rome II Regulation and The Hague Convention on the Law Applica-
ble to traffic accidents, which remains in force in 12 MS of the EU and is given priority from 
Article 28 of the Rome II Regulation. 
A desired unification of conflict-of-laws rules regarding non-contractual obligations has, 
as such, not been reached, but possible options can (and should) be undertaken in order to 
ensure a unified approach in front of determining a law applicable to non-contractual obliga-
tions: either a denunciation of The Hague Convention186 or a reformulation of Article 28 of the 
Rome II, so that the Regulation is given precedence over the Convention. 
On the contrary of this co-existence and possibility of having different applicable laws ac-
cording to the state where the damage occurs, Rome II Regulation, on the other hand has kept 
a very unitary approach as regards the applicable law to the quantification of damages and 
the determination of civil liability. This particular choice could be the result of the unitary 
approach being dominant in many MS national rules,187 but as this paper has been advocating, 
181  Article 3 of Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 May 2000 on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending 
Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Fourth motor insurance Directive) OJ l 181, 20. 7. 2000, p. 65–74.
182  Papettas, op. cit., p. 308.
183  Papettas, op. cit., p. 310.
184  See in general, Papettas, op. cit., pp. 297–321.
185  Aside the CJEU jurisprudence, the MIDs also prohibit insurers to rely upon the provisions of insurance policies against third 
parties, see Papettas, op. cit., p. 310.
186  Amongst others, see for this recommendation also Garriga, op. cit., pp. 137–148.
187  Kadner Graziano, La responsabilité…, op. cit. 
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a dépeçage at least in the level of cross-border traffic accident could be beneficiary in order to 
enhance the protection levels for the injured parties. With the actual regime, these injured 
parties could potentially face very low sums in compensation for their damages, often dispro-
portionate to the actual costs of healthcare in their national systems.
The drafting of conflict-of-law rules in non-contractual obligations involves without any 
doubt striking a difficult balance between different policy considerations,188 and the analysis 
that this article has proposed acknowledges that legal predictability and certainty are impor-
tant policy choices that European private international law instruments focuses on. However, 
in cross-border traffic accidents, a real mechanism should be put into place by the Rome II Reg-
ulation, allowing for a fragmentation between the applicable law of the tortfeasor civil liability 
and to the applicable law of the quantification of damages. In the current state of art, there are 
no legal “ways out” this unitary approach that would favor the traffic accident victims, either 
than a broad and maybe overreaching interpretation of Article 4.3 Rome II Regulation, or the 
non-binding Recital 33 of the same instrument. 
The need for a degree of flexibility should therefore, be taken into consideration in order to 
make sure that the conflict-of-law rules fit the needs of specific cases, giving way to the orig-
inally United States approach of interest analysis. It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that 
Rome II Regulation at least includes the principle of party autonomy, somehow unknown to 
the realm of non-contractual obligation, but with the potential of becoming “one of the most 
important rules in tort, just as it has always been in contract”.189
 Last but not least, comes the CJEU’s liberal approach to the use of forum actoris through 
the Odenbreit case and the will of the Court to act (once again)190 as the highest instance that 
protects the vulnerable parties in situations not favorable to their position, even though this 
line of jurisprudence would mean turmoil in the national litigation processes of non-contrac-
tual obligations and damage quantification.191
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IZRAVNE TUŽBE PROTIV OSIGURAVATELJA U PREKOGRANIČNIM 
PROMETNIM NEZGODAMA U EUROPEIZIRANOM MEĐUNARODNOM 
PRIVATNOM PRAVU - KAKVU ZAŠTITU UŽIVAJU OŠTEćENE STRANKE?
Sažetak
U članku se raspravlja o zakonu koji se primjenjuje na prekogranične prometne nezgode, iz 
perspektive zaštite oštećenika. Uvođenje načela kao što su izravne tužbe treće oštećene osobe 
protiv osiguravatelja (forum actoris), uglavnom zbog liberalnog pristupa suda, dovodi u pitanje 
odnos između međunarodnog privatnog prava Unije i pravila međunarodnog privatnog prava 
država članica. Ovim se člankom predlaže odgovor na pitanje “Pruža li međunarodno privatno 
pravo Unije odgovarajuću zaštitu oštećenim strankama?” s ciljem davanja i nekoliko preporu-
ka za reformu Uredbe Rim II.
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